copy to J.D. CSA
" " Section V.
10/8/45

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TICOMI/-55

-1-

TOP SECRET "U"

INTERROGATION OF SEVEN MEMBERS OF NAA 11

The attached is a report on the interrogation of the following seven members of NAA 11, part of the 'Norway Party', at Wiesbaden and Ziegenhain.

HPTM. SCHMIDT
OBLT. FISCHLE
UFFZ. EXTER
UFFZ. BETHGE
WM. BLOME
OBGEFR. FAURE
UFFZ. FRUEMKE

It is preceded by a preliminary SCI interrogation report on Schmidt.

No. of Pages 13
Copy No. 33

TICOM
2 Aug 1945

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
MISSION FOR GERMANY
United States Forces
European Theater

12 July 1945

TO: Chief, CIB, USFET

SUBJECT: Preliminary Report, Interrogation of Hpt Hermann SCHMIDT, of Nachrichten Aufklarungabteilung 11.

1. Attached herewith preliminary report of interrogation of Hpt Hermann SCHMIDT, of Nachrichten Aufklarungabteilung II, made by Sgt. Plung of SCI. SCHMIDT is one of the 35 Germans brought from Sweden to American zone in Germany, 5 of whom are now under interrogation by us at MFIU No. 4.

2. SCHMIDT was chosen for the first detailed interrogation because he is the ranking officer and CO of the group.

3. The interrogation develops that the group is much more German signal intelligence than GIS as we know it. It also engaged in intercepting Russian military traffic and de-coding.

4. We are in close contact with American Signal Intelligence in this case. We have turned over to Lt. Col. Rubin and Captain Ivanoff of Signal Intelligence a considerable number of documents surrendered with the 35 above mentioned personnel and expect soon to have experts of Signal Intelligence to work with us on the interrogation. Assuming that interrogations now in progress by us and MFIU No. 4. do not disclose more connection with German Intelligence proper as we know it, it will later be recommended that this case be turned over entirely to Signal Intelligence.

ANDREW H. BERDING
Lt. Col., A. C.
Chief, OSS/X-2, Germany

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HQ. USAFET, G-2 Div., SCI Det.
APO 757

10 Jul 45

SUBJECT: Preliminary Report, Interrogation of Hpt Hermann SCHMIDT, of Nachrichten Aufklarungabteilung 11.

TO: : CO, SCI Detachment, 12 Army Group

1. Circumstances of custody

On 9 May 45, S., then in GJOVIK (Norway, 140 Km north of OSLO), received an order to turn over all documents and papers to the Nachrichtenfuehrer of the 20th Gebirgs-Armee, General Major MENNY. On 10 May, thru a Lt SALA, MENNY ordered S. to organize a group which would incorporate the experience and knowledge of his Nachrichtenabteilung 11. When S. asked SALA to explain the reason for the creation of such a contingent group, he was informed that the Allies wanted a record of their war experiences in signals matters.

During the evening of 10 May, Lt SALA was present when a representative of the Swedish Army, Capt TORNEMANN, who had come from STOCKHOLM, visited 20th Army HQ in LILLEHAMMER. By agreement with the Allies, it had been arranged that the SCHMIDT group of 22 members should go to Sweden. On 11 May, the group went to LILLEHAMMER and S. reported to MENNY who informed the Chief of Staff.

The group left LILLEHAMMER 11 May and crossed the Swedish border east of ELVERUM, 12 May. It arrived at Swedish Inf Reg 17 and was taken to an internment camp in BAKAMO. After the group had been at BAKAMO eight days, a Capt (?) JOHANSON came to see S. on orders from Dr. HELLSTROM, chief of the Swedish Signals Service. JOHANSON left but returned in a fortnight and told S. that the work was to be carried on in Germany where they were to give their experience and knowledge either by documentation or by demonstration and instruction. He assured S. that the members of the group would not be PW's and that, after a security check, they would be free and in a position to help their dependents. Before they left Sweden, they signed a statement saying they were leaving Sweden voluntarily to go to Germany. JOHANSON also said that Dr. HELLSTROM would go along and stay in Germany as a liaison officer for the Swedish Signals Service.

On 12 Jun, the group was flown to Germany in two American planes. The group was interned in ZIEGENHAIN on 13 Jun. Five members of the group (Hpt SCHMIDT is one of them) stayed in ZIEGENHAIN for eight days and were then transferred to 12 AG IC.

2. Biographical data

Born: 16 Feb 17, in ALLENDORF (Kreis Dillenburg), Hessen-Nassau; father, Karl: born 17 Oct 1887 in BURGENDORF (Kreis Siegen), member of Social Democratic party before 1933; mother, Emma, nee BRAAS, 4 Aug 1890 in ALLENDORF; brother, Alfred: born 23 Dec 14; in the Wehrmacht since 4 May 39; Artillery Uffz; civilian occupation, roof tiler.

Schooling: Volksschule and Berursschule in BURGENDORF, one year (1937) in the Aussenhandelsschule (Foreign Trade School) in HAMBURG.

Work experience: In 1937 he became an apprentice with the firm of Joseph MEISSNER in BURBACK (Kreis Siegen). At the end of the year, he moved to KOLN with the firm.

Work service (Arbeitsdienst): On 4 Apr 38, S. began his Arbeitsdienst. He spent one month at EMSLAND and 5 months at Burg Vogelsand (SCHLEIDEN): work consisted of swamp draining, building of fortifications and erecting barbed wire obstacles.

Political affiliations: S. has been a member of the Arbeitsfront since 1937.

3. MILITARY TRAINING

S. was inducted into the military service on 17 Nov 38, the 3rd Co. Nachrichten Abteilung 9, in WETZLAR. Before his induction he had taken an intelligence test in DUSSELDORF and he ascribes his induction into the Signals Service to the result of the test. S. received his basic training in N.A. 9, 3rd Co in WETZLAR, one of only 7 such Horch (Intercept) Companies in the German Army. The other 6 companies (N.A.'s) were as follows:

3rd	N.A. 57	Stuttgart
3rd	N.A. 7	Munchen
3rd	N.A. 18	Liegnitz
3rd	N.A. 3	Frankfurt (Oder)
3rd	N.A. 26	Koln
3rd	N.A. 56	Bielefeld

Recruits were trained as Horchfunker (Intercept), Peilfunker (DF, direction-finding operators), Sendefunker (Morse operators) or as drivers. S. received intercept and DF training. S.'s training ended at the beginning of the war.

4. Military Service

a. From Aug 39 until 12 May 40, S. worked as an intercept operator in the vic of SAARBRUCKEN.

b. 12 May 40, he went to a Waffenschule (OCS) and attended school from 20 May to 9 Aug. He left the school as a Feldwebel and Anwarter. From 9 Aug to 12 Jan 41, he worked as cadre in HALLE (the Waffenschule was also located there). He became a lieutenant 1 Mar 41.

c. On 12 Jan, he joined a newly activated unit, Fernaufklarung Co 611 (a long-distance intercept company) which went to Poland (REICHSHOF), then BIALAPOTLASKA (30 km west of BREST LITOVSK). The company took part in the Russian campaign from the beginning in Jun 41. The Army Group was the Heeres Gruppe Mitte under Feldmarschall BOCK and the company was in the 4th Army commanded by Feldmarschall KLUGE. S. took part in the advance on PROTZANA, MINSK, ORSHA and SMOLENSK. The company continued to ROSSLAWL, in the direction of MOSCOW; on 6 Nov 41, S. was slightly wounded before MOSCOW.

5. Nahepeilfeldzug Work (Short-range DFing)

a. It was at about this time that S. was entrusted with the first Nahpeilfeldzug (front line DFing platoon) in the German Army. The work took place in the vicinity of OREL. A special apparatus, the Nahelfeldpeiler a/c was used. The set was a combination of a French receiver

and a German Peil Rahmen (direction finder). It was, according to S., the first short wave DF machine in the German Army and gave excellent results. This set picked up only Bodenwellen (earth waves) which are but a small part of waves emitted. Since these waves must be picked up in comparatively close proximity to the source, the DFing machines were, on the average, 5 to 15 km from the sending apparatus.

b. This type of DF work was very important for ascertaining troop concentrations and the location of enery CP's.

c. S. continued to do this work until Aug 42. The chain of command, insofar as the dissemination of information obtained was concerned, was from the CO of the 611 Fernaufklarung Co who gave it to Division, Oberst von LUTTWITZ Kampfgruppe. From there it went on to 24 Panzer Korps, and finally to 2 Panzer Armee.

6. Liaison Officer, Nachrichtenaufklarung, 4 Armee

From Aug 42 to 6 Dec 43, S. was the liaison officer in charge of Nachrichtenaufklarung in the 4 Armee staff. His job was the preparation of collected material for evaluation and dissemination. It is evident that he is in a position to speak authoritatively on matters of signal and general intelligence, not only from the point of view of the front line officer, but also from the point of view of the staff officer with a composite picture. S.'s superior was Oberst von DAWANS who was killed in the west as a General Major. DAWAN' successor was von GULDENFELDT. The CG of the 4 Armee was General Oberst HEINRICI.

7. Finlandia

a. In Mar 43, S. had become an Oblt. On 17 Jan 44, he was transferred to Finland, Nachrichtenfernaufklarungszug Nord. This unit was assigned to the 20th Gebirgsarmee (mountain army) under the command of General Oberst DIETL. DIETL's successor was RENDULIC. The Nachrichtenaufklarungszug Nord was under the command of Oblt SCHMIDTBERGER and S. was second in command. The unit's mission was to obtain signal intelligence from the Russians, mostly by the use of intercept.

b. The unit's strength of about 80 was increased to approximately 300 by reinforcements from Naheaufklarungscompagnie 961 on 1 Mar 44. The composite unit was called Nachrichten Aufklarungsabteilung 11 (N.A.A. 11) : the CO was Hpt DAISER and S. was his deputy. The intensification of Radio intelligence work was made necessary by the paucity of troops in the theatre. By increased Aufklarung work fewer troops were needed for reconnaissance, capturing of PW's, etc.

c. When Finland capitulated on 3 Sep 44, the retreat began via northern Finland. 1 Nov 44, S. had become Hauptmann. 22 Apr 45, he took over command of N.A.A. 11. N.A.A. has had excellent success in its work. In Finland it operated with old apparatus, partially described above. It also received a new, completely German Nahefeldpeiler which was more stable and shock proof and calibrated in Kiloherz rather than in meters.

8. Code breaking

One of the most important accomplishments of the Nachrichtenfernaufklarungszug Nord was the breaking of enemy codes, here specifically Russian, and later, Allied and Swedish codes. Russian codes, for example were built up from one another. Previous traffic and experience, therefore

were utilized to good advantage from 1941 to 1945. Code specialists in the SCHMIDT group are:

**

Uffz	EXTER
Uffz	BETHGE
Uffz	FRUNKE
Obgfr	FAURE

As an example of work done, S. cited the breaking of an NKWD (RIS) intelligence code that has 10,000 possibilities.

9. N.A.A. Card Catalogue

Among the documents of the group is a cardefile of some 6,000 cards. These were made up from information obtained thru Nachrichtenaufklarung, culling Russian papers (obtained from Sweden), radio monitoring, expecially special orders of the day, giving units and personalities. Other data was supplied by the Army, I c, Finland. In the SCHMIDT group, Oblt FISCHLE was administrative head of this section. The section specialist was Feldwebel PLOME, Hans and another employee was Feldwebel Helmut BARGCORN. There was only one copy of the catalogue.

10. Individual Specialties in SCHMIDT group

S. gave the following specialty designation to members of the group:

1.	SCHMIDT:	local and long-distance (Nah und Fernaufklarung) signal intelligence
2.	LORENZ:	Horchfunker
3.	HEIDER:	Horch and Peilfunker
4.	FISCHLE:	Horch and Peil work and evaluation: in Fernaufklarung only
5.	DEHN:	Administration and ski instruction
6.	LIEK:	Naheaufklarung; Horchfunker; worked in Balkans.
7.	BEULE:	Horch and Peilfunker
8.	GARDEMAN:	Evaluator
9.	JAHNS:	Horchfunker
10.	WILLE:	Horchfunker
11.	RIEDER:	Horch and Peilfunker
12.	GERHARDT:	Horchfunker
13.	BLOME:	Chief evaluator
14.	FAURE:	Decoder, Russian translater
15.	KLEIMAN:	Horchfunker
16.	KOHLMANN:	Peil evaluator; specialist for Wellenausbreitung (DF work without a DF machine; had to work with Luftwaffe Weather Station).
17.	AUER:	excellent Horchfunker
18.	FRUEMKE:	Decoder and interpreter; better Russian than German.
19.	EXTER:	Decoding chief
20.	BETHGE:	Decoder
21.	BARGCORN:	Evaluator
22.	WAIBEL:	Horchfunker

11. Translator and Interpreter Group

S. states that he has no knowledge of the group of fourteen translators and interpreters attached to the N.A.A. group and ignores the reason for their being.

12. Documents

In addition to the above mentioned card file, the group had in its possession various pamphlets, folders, books and papers used in carrying out its missions. These include material on commanders of the Russian Army, Russian APO lists (used in connection with intercepted traffic), Russian gazetteers, Russian Army Organization, enemy planes, Russian Armor, Russian abbreviations and military classifications (tanks, etc).

There is also material on Russian W/T stations, radio instruments of the Red Army, Russian call signs, NKVD (RIS) code material, cryptanalytic data on Russian W/T, a folder on Broken (Russian Cipher) systems, etc. (Inventory attached).

13. Desiderata

a. S. was completely cooperative under interrogation. There is no doubt that he has authoritative information on German Nachrichtenaufklarung and that he is willing to put his knowledge at our disposal. Moreover, his experiences as a staff officer have given him an opportunity of seeing the overall picture with respect to German Signal intelligence and its position in the general shape of things. Participation in the Eastern campaigns has made it possible for him to garner a huge fund of information on the interplay between German and Russian Signal Services. To what extent his knowledge would interest us specifically, remains to be seen.

b. On the grounds of experience and knowledge, he should be capable of holding the mirror up to our own signal service: he has offered his services to attempt to analyze Allied signal weaknesses. He further offers advice on key improvements. He indicated, for example, that messages encoded by American machine AM-1, can be deciphered if a mistake is made. This is probably Punchinello's secret, but there are probably many other matters which we ignore.

c. S. should be exhaustively interrogated, if possible by a signals technician, so that his technical knowledge may be extracted. In the process, it should be possible to sound out his knowledge of matters which interest us more particularly.

Nathan Plung
S/Sgt, SCI

TOP SECRET "U"

NORWAY PARTY INTERROGATIONS.

The Norway Party, consisting of thirty-six persons, contains elements of two distinct groups, called the SCHMIDT and SALA groups after their respective leaders. The work of these two groups is entirely unrelated, and the interrogation of the senior member of the SALA group present, Sdf(Z) SPENNERMANN, was sufficient to show that this party was of no interest to TICOM.

The interrogation was done in two stages. Six members of the party, allegedly on the basis of importance, had been segregated from the others and were housed in the jail at WIESBADEN. The remainder were in Camp 95 at ZIEGENHAIN. The importance of the six at WIESBADEN was not always immediately obvious. Three of these were respectively a W/T operator, an intercept operator and a skiing instructor.

At WIESBADEN Hpt. SCHMIDT and Oblt. FISCHLE were interrogated, and at ZIEGENHAIN Uffz. EXTER, Uffz. BETHGE, Wm. BLOME, Obgefr. FAURE, and Uffz. FRUEMKE. The interrogation was carried out by Capt. LIVELY, AUS and Capt. CAMPBELL, IC, assisted at ZIEGENHAIN by Capt. MCCOWN of Detachment D.

I. Tues., 24th July, 1945

SCHMIDT, Hermann, Hptm.
Commanding Officer of Nachrichtenaufklaerungabteilung 11.

1. Organisation of the Abteilung:

The Abteilung was an independent unit, subordinated directly to GendNA/OKH. Subordinate to it were: Nahaufklaerungskomp. 961 and Fernaufklaerungszug Nord. It had no connection with KONA Nord, which according to S. was located in LIBAU.

2. Tasks:

When in Finland, Sigint directed against Russia.

When in Norway, Sigint directed against the Allies, Sweden, Finland, and in so far as distance would permit, Russia.

3. Strength of the Abt. varied from 420 to 450 men. W/T operators were detached to the Abt. from the Armee Nachrichtenregiment as need arose, which accounts for the fluctuations in strength.

4. Distribution of tasks:

Intercept operators	200 - 250 men (75 sets)
D/F operators	30
Evaluation	40
Cryptanalysis	25
Own W/T traffic	30
Drivers, cooks, etc.	100+.

5. Type of intelligence product:

Two types of report were prepared:
1. Tagesmeldungen
2. Feindlagemeldungen.

6. Distribution of intelligence:

Intelligence was sent to Chief of Staff, XX Gebirgsarmee. Extracts went to Gen d. NA by T/P. Gen d. NA kept the Abt. informed of crypto developments on other parts of the front.

7. Relative importance of the various sources of intelligence:

In view of the relatively small number of people employed on cryptanalysis in the Abt., S. was asked to assess the relative value of sigint sources in preparing the Feindlagemeldungen. In his opinion the evaluation of message content (Spruchauswertung) came first. This held true in practice since the Abt. could always read enough Russian traffic for their purposes. Second came W/T Evaluation (Funkauswertung). Third, D/F Evaluation (Peilauswertung). Lastly, general information (allgemeine Hinweise).

SCHMIDT considered his crypto section fully adequate. They did not use Hollerith or other machinery.

8. Type of crypto work carried on:

S. was able to answer this question only in very general terms. There was no crypto work to speak of as far as the Americans and British were concerned, since most of the traffic they intercepted in Norway was P/L. They made no attempt to deal with British or American high-grade ciphers. He knew, however, of the large amount of valuable intelligence given away on the Western Front by insecure police nets. They had considerable success with Swedish army ciphers. During the spring manoeuvres of Feb-March 1945 they were able to build up a complete tactical picture of the Swedish army in two months. With regard to Russian traffic, the Abt. did everything up to and including 4-figure. Russian 5-figure they considered insoluble. All traffic which could not be solved was forwarded to Gen d. NA. That meant about 50% of the intercept material. When asked to give an inventory of the codes and ciphers studied by the Abt., S. referred the question to his crypto personnel (specifically EXTER)

9. Other Sigint units in Norway:

MPHS STAVANGER	Kptlt. WEIDNER
MPHS TROMSOE	Freg. kapt. DISTERWEG

LNA Regt 355, with 1 Komp. in STAVANGER employed against England; Abt 355 was located about 20 km. S of OSLO, under Maj. CAMERLANDER.

II. FISCHLE, Oblt.

Oblt. Fischle was head of Auswertung (Evaluation) with NAA 11. He did not have very much to contribute. He had joined the Abt. in Finland in Sept. 44, but since he knew no Russian and was concerned with Russian traffic for only two months or so he was scarcely qualified to speak on that; and then in Norway they had done nothing worth calling Evaluation, for the Allied traffic was unfamiliar to them at first and anyhow there was no one to whom they could pass results in time to be of any interest.

TOP SECRET"U"

III. EXTER,KARL,Uffz.

Military service:-
17 Feb. 41: called up to NAA 20 at Hanburg, where eh was trained as an intercept with the 1st Kompanie.
16 Apr. 41: transferred to Horchlehrkompanie,HALLE, housed in the Heeresnachrichtenschule. Three weeks later to the Nachrichtenersatzabteilung,FRANKFURT.There he was trained as an ordinary W/T operator(Sendefunker).
End June 41: posted to Horchzug N in Finland, where he remained till the unit moved from there to Norway at the beginning of Nov. 44. On 1st Jan 45 he was transferred from the Zug to the staff of NAA 11.

Exter was given no specific cryptanalytic training, and indeed had been put on to the work in the first place only because he had proved hopeless as an intercept operator. However he had been employed on Entzifferung from Aug.41 onwards, and he is regarded by the others in the party as their best man in this field. The actual head of the Entzifferung section of NAA 11 was a Wm. ZOELLER, but he was posted away in Feb 45 and no replacement was made.

While in Finland, the unit was occupied exclusively in covering Russian Army and NKWD traffic on that front. A small amount of Naval traffic was picked up from time to time and worked on, but not regularly as this was not their proper commitment. After the move to Norway it was practically impossible to take any Russian traffic owing to the distance, and the cover was switched to British-American, Swedish and Finnish traffics. Little success was obtained with the Allied traffic, The operators were unfamiliar with Allied procedure, and they were working on it for a few months only. Exter had worked (and with some success) only on SLIDEX and a certain AFK 11 which was a table 26/26 or 25/25(he was not sure which). He had done no work himself on Swedish-that was BETHGE'S specialty- and nothing was done with Finnish except one simple substitution of which he had no personal knowledge. He had no knowledge of any specifisally American system apart from the two general Allied types mentioned above.

Exter was then questioned on various Russian codes found among the documents of the unit. He first described the NKWD Code R4ZC 1800.This has already been dealt with in Ticom I/19c p12f, but the present description deffers in certain details from the other. It was, he said, a code of 50 pages, with 50 lines to a page in two columns of 25 each. On the bottom ten lines of each page, between these two columns , was a vertical column of the numbers 0-9 in a hatted order, different for each page. (This is presumably the "chiffrant" of I/19c, but the term was unknown to E.). Page and line equivalents were given by strips of hatted figure-bigrams; there were ten sets of each. Page-strips were laid along the bottom of the book and line-strips (in two columns of 25) set on the page according to the hatted vertical column. The page and line keys used, and the setting on the setting on the page, were given by a 4-figure indicator.E. was no longer certain which elements of this indicated the various items, but he thought the setting of the line-strip on the page was given by the third figure. According to E. this code was in use from April 44 onwards. They had had material up to the end of their time in Finland, but were unable to intercept it thereafter, and so he could not say whether it had gone out of use or not.

His information on other codes found among the documents was extremely scanty. He said that many of these were codes solved or captured on other parts of the front and sent to them by Berlin for information; they had not worked on them themselves.

Northern Fleet Code — This was a 4-fig. code with table-recipher. They had read it for a month, but had given it up as not being their commitment.Purely Naval tasks were handed over to MPHS Kirkenes.

R4ZC 1100 — This he could not remember: it was out of date by 1944.

Hammerfest & Seeland. Oslo. These too were Naval codes, though probably used also by coast defence units. He knew no details.

R5ZC 1560. Reciphered by strips.

R4ZC 1700 & ReZC 1427. On these he referred us to FAURE.

E. was then asked for a brief review of the types of code he had worked on:-

2-figure These were used both by Army and NKWD. At first they were purely alphabetic; later they were hatted, and as a final improvement the commoner letters and numbers were allotted three or four different equivalents. They were used up to the end of hostilities.

3-figure These were mainly Army, but were also used by the Air Forces. They consisted in general of 10 pages of 100 positions each, reciphered by strips.

4-figure These were a) of the NKWD type described above, and b) code-books reciphered by an additive. In this latter type, they had had considerable success with traffic of an NKWD net on the White Sea front, controlled from the NKWD HQ at ARCHANGEL, but that was with a captured basic book and instructions for the system.

They could not cope with 5-figure; that was sent on to Berlin. E. had no knowledge whatever of Russian letter-codes.

IV. BETHGE, Ernst, Uffz. (Note: interrogation was made difficult by the fact that this PW suffers from an exceedingly bad stammer).

From the beginning of the war until Nov. 43 Bethge served with a survey unit (Vermessungstruppen). Then there came a circular from OKH appealing for mathematicians. Out of the 200 odd who presented themselves in Berlin, 20 were chosen, including Bethge. He then had four months' cryptanalytic training in Berlin and Juterbog. From March till September 1944 he worked at Juterbog in the analytical machine section with DR.PIETSCH and Wm. DOERING, and was concerned almost entirely with the French-C36 and BC-38, though he also did a little work on the American M209. He has no knowledge of the B211 or any British machine, nor did he do any research on German systems.

In Sept.44 he was posted to Aussenstelle "HALDEN"(GruppSued) of FNAST 9 in Norway to work on so-far unsolved Swedish systems. Fnast 9, which had been in BERGEN, was moved in the summer of 44 to Italy, but the Aussenstelle was left behind. From Jan 45, though officially still on the strength of the Aussenstelle, he in fact worked with NAA 11 which had by then arrived in Norway, and in March 45 he was transferred to the staff of NAA 11 at GJOEVIK. Since going to Norway he had worked solely on Swedish systems, except for one short unsuccessful attempt on an English 5-letter code.

The Swedish machine could not be read. The codes with which they did have success were all low-grade military codes-simple reciprocal substitutions,2-and3-letter codes, and transposition of an elementary type. The material for this was obtained during the Swedish manoeuvres of February and March this year, and a complete order of battle was built up.

V. BLOME, Hans, Wm. Chief Evaluator of NAA 11

Military service:

2 Dec. 40: called up to Nachrichtenersatzabteilung 2 in Stettin, where he was trained as a W/T operator.

Feb 41: went on to Horchlehrkompanie in HALLE.

ca. May-June 41: NAErsAbt in FRANKFURT, where he had a fortnight's instruction as an Auswerter
Then to Horchzug N in Finland, where he remained, retreating with the rest of the unit to Norway. On 1st Jan.45 he was transferred from the Zug to the NAA 11 Stab.

B. gave a general summary of the Russian call-sign system:-

The Russians, unlike the Germans or the Anglo-Americans, were always systematic-i.e. their books and tables were either systematically arranged or if not were used in a systematic way. Then there was a marked difference between the call-sign usage of the Army and Air Force on the one hand and the NKWD on the other. NKWD call-signs, as far as "operational" units were concerned,(i.e. forward of division)were always pronouncable.The NKWD front staffs(corresponding roughly to a German Heeresgruppe)working with divs or regts would take their call-signs unsystematically from TPR 43, but if possible from only one Teiltafel(100 c/s). The divisional and regimental nets would take their C/S syatematically from TPR 43.

Army and Air Force forward of division took c/s systematically from TPR 43. Rear of division they worked by quartering the table and obtaining the c/s by the intersection of day-month coordinates on a systematically selected diagonal. But sometimes they used TPR 43 quite unsystematically.

Blome appeared to be a very able man, and could probably provide detailed answers to any particular questions in his field, though of course his knowledge ends, for all practical purposes,with Nov. 44.

VI. FAURE, Alexander, Obgefr.

26 Aug 39: called up to a Construction Bn.(Baubatn.)
8 Nov. 39: transferred to Pionierbtl. 19. From there to Dolmetscherschule in LEIPZIG.Was given an Entzifferung course in Berlin at the beginning of the Russian campaign.
22 June 41: NA Ers Abt FRANKFURT.Posted immediately to Horchzug N in Finland.

Faure could give only scanty details of the two codes about which we had been referred to him by Extr. R3ZC was a 3-fig. code, with 10 pages of 100 positions each, 10 by 10, alphabetically arranged. One column of each page,he thought the 8th, was empty. Only the hundreds and tens figures of each group were reciphered. R4ZC 1700 had also 10 pages of 100 positions per page. The 2nd digit of the group gave page, the 1st digit which half of the page, 3rd and 4th digits line and column. It was reciphered by bigram tables, but he was not absolutely sure of this.

VII. FRUEMKE,Igor, Uffz.

Nov 38:NAA3 Fernsprechkompanie; with this unit through the Polish and French campaigns.
Nov 40:Dolmetscherschule LEIPZIG.
Mar 41:OKH in 7/VI for training.
June 41:Na Ers Abt FRANKFURT; posted to Horchzug N in Finland.

F. had no special knowledge of any particular system to offer. Both

he and FAURE worked entirely on the currently read codes and never worked on any unsolved systems. In fact, they were both more occupied with translating than with deciphering.

From these interrogations, it appears that NAA 11 was a small unit, working on a quiet sector of the eastern front, capable of producing an adequate flow of intelligence from reading low and medium grade codes, but not equipped for any strenuous cryptanalytic effort. After leaving Finland its operational value seems to have been nil.